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HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF-SGVIET DOMESTIC BOND POLICY
On January 21, 1918, the new Bolshevik regime repudiated the
internal as well as the external debt of the Tsarist and Provisional
governments that had preceded it. That the Soviet government subsequently
made extensive use of domestic bond financing is not widely known, and
Soviet domestic bond policy has received little attention in the Western
literature. The purpose of this paper is to provide an .analytical history
of Soviet domestic bond policy.
Until the early 1960s the Soviet State Budget (Gosbiudzhet SSSR) ,
which is a consolidated budget for all governmental units, ordinarily
2
recorded an annual deficit. In the early years of Bolshevik rule deficits
were apparently financed by direct currency issue. Domestic state bonds
were first issued in 1922, at the close of the civil war, as part of a
program designed to restore monetary stability. By the mid-1920s state
domestic bond sales had become the principal mode of financing budget
deficits, and this continued to be the case, with only temporary exceptions
3(notably during the first two years of WWII ), through 1957.
The share of gross bond sales proceeds in all budgetary sources
of funds provides a rough measure of the relative significance of domestic
4bond financing. Gross bond proceeds rose from an average of 6.8% of
budget sources during the late 1920s to a peak of 13% in 1931, at the
height of the industrialization drive. The share declined to between 5
and 6% for the remainder of the 1930s, but it again reached 13% in 1943,
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the most difficult war year. Between 1946 and 1956 the share varied
between 6 and 9%. However, with the termination of the mass subscription
bond series in 1957, the share fell to less then 1% in 1963. Since 1963,
proceeds from bond sales to the public have been treated as a source of
5
funds to the State Bank (Goabank ) rather than to the State Budget.
That the Soviet State Budget relied upon domestic bond financing
during periods of rapid development, war and post-war reconstruction re-
quires no special explanation. Changes in the expenditure-revenue gap and
in the tax structure of the Soviet State Budget over the course of develop-
ment and war do not differ materially from the patterns characteristic of
the budgets of non-socialist countries under similar circumstances, and
the reasons for these phenomena are essentially the same. However, there
are a number of unusual, and indeed even unique, features of Soviet
domestic bond policy, and an examination of these features also helps to
explain the virtual abandonment of domestic bond instruments in the late
1950s.
The first section below is devoted to a brief description of the
historical evolution of Soviet domestic bond policy. The principal charac-
teristics of the mass subscription bond, which generated the bulk of bond
proceeds from 1929 onward, are described and analyzed in the second section.
The third section seeks to identify and to evaluate the main determinants
of Soviet domestic bond policy.
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I.
The main features of Soviet domestic bond issues are summarized
7
in Table 1. There are a number of trends that stand out in sharp relief.
As might be expected, issue amount (Column 5) and term to maturity (Column
Q
21) increase over time. The growing and eventually dominant role of the
mass subscription bond, which was sold on a ten-month installment plan and
usually: by payroll deduction, is also obvious. More surprising, however,
are the accompanying downward trend in coupon and premia rates offered to
the public (Columns 18, 19 and 20) and the frequent resort to conversions
and other adjustments in face value, maturities and rates of return of
outstanding issues (Columns 22 and 23) . Of interest also is the fact that
the Soviet State Budget came increasingly, and eventually exclusively, to
rely upon lottery devices to determine the returns, if any, to bond holders
(Column 20)
.
The evolution of Soviet domestic bond policjr may be divided into
a number of more or less distinct periods. The first, 1922 through 1927 or
1929, was one of experimentation and of relatively high-cost, short-term
borrowing through open-market channels. The variety of different issues
during this period was a consequence, according to one Soviet source, of
g
the inexperience of policy makers in financial affairs. The earliest bond
issues were in-kind or gold-backed, which is explained by the fact that
they were marketed during a period of severe monetary instability. No such
guarantees were ever again offered once stabilization had been assured.
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Table 1
Notes
:
a. One pood equals 36 lbs. or 16.38 kg.
b. 1960 rubles, i.e., the decimal place was moved one place to the left in 1960.
c. See discussion of retirement schedules in Section II of the text.
d. This and all subsequent subscription bond issues through 1941 were described
as "all-win" lotteries, for all bond holders stood to win something over the
course of the loan.
e. R ° restricted.
Sources:
V. P. D v iachenko et_al
.
, eds., Finansovo-kreditnye slovar
'
(Moscow: Gosfinizdat,
1961), pp. 297-305.
L. B. Valler, "Razvitie gosudarstvennogo kredita v SSSR," in P. Ya. Dmitrichev,
e<** > Gosudarstyennye zaimy v SSSR (Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1956), pp. 20-43.
M. Iu. Nakhmanovich, "Gosudarstvennye zaimy SSSR i ikh rol* na razlichnykh etapakh
rasvitila narodnogo khoziaistva. Gosudarstvennye zaimy i denezhno-veshchevye
loterei v sovremennykh uslovilakh,' in P. A* Chetverikov, ed., Sberegatel'nyp
kass^ SSSR ^za 50 let (Moscow: Izdat. Finansy, 1972), pp. 42-58.
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Early issues were also sold on the market at discount, but this practice
was also soon abandoned.
The State Budget experimented during the 1920s with bonds ear-
marked for sale to particular classes of Soviet society. Because of its
relative size and remoteness, both geographically and politically, the
peasantry was the main object of this technique (Column 9), but special
issues were also directed to workers and the Nepmen. Class earmarking
was abandoned after 1927, apparently because it was not successful. A
large portion of the Issues that were earmarked for sale to the peasantry,
for example, were in fact purchased by the urban population.
Another type of bond was issued in the 1920s by the State Budget
that was earmarked for sale to productive enterprises (Column 6) . This
reflected the difficulty encountered in attempting to market bonds to the
population at large, for It was apparently easier to sell bonds to enter-
12
prises. But It also represented an early attempt to control and/or to
reduce enterprise liquidity selectively. With the development of the con-
trol functions of the State Bank (Gosbank) with respect to enterprise
receipts, outlays and deposits and the success of the mass subscription
13bond, bond sales to enterprises were terminated after 1929.
The use of a. lottery device of some sort to enhance the attrac-
tiveness of Soviet domestic bonds was common from the earliest issues (Column
20), and it is a technique that has been widely utilized elsewhere. State
lottery and premium bonds were very popular In England, for example, prior
to 1823, when the practice was prohibited by Act of Parliament. In England
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a lottery device was ordinarily utilized merely to distribute premia over
and above a coupon rate, and several Soviet issues of the 1920s operated
similarly. However, the last such combination was offered in 1929. There-
after, bonds were either lottery or coupon bonds.
The first mass subscription bond, with provisions for payroll
deduction and installment purchase, was issued in February, 1927. It
was a relatively small issue, but its success apparently surprised and
greatly impressed officials of the State Budget. Another, and larger,
issue appeared in August of the same year, inaugurating a new period in
the history of Soviet domestic bonds. The August issue was accompanied
by a major propaganda campaign on the theme of rapid industrialization.
Committees were organized in each factory, institution and organization
to encourage subscription. The organization of subscription committees
was not unlike that of certain community charity drives in the United
States today,, in which members of the committee make personal visits to
potential donors. However, the Soviets definitely followed "hard sell"
methods. This proved to be a very effective way to mobilize informal and
formal pressure upon potential purchasers . A measure of the success of the
bond subscription committees may be seen in the fact that this and all sub-
sequent mass subscription bond issues were oversubscribed, and frequently by
16
a considerable margin. In effect, the development of the subscription
bond and the formation of bond promotional committees removed bond sales
from the open market, thereby laying the groundwork for reducing expected
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rates of return below open market levels.
Thus, by the end of the 1920s the main outlines of Soviet
domestic bond policy had been drawn and greatly simplified. From 1930
onward the mass subscription bond was the principal source of bond pro-
ceeds, and in that year the industrialization and peasant issues of 1927-
1928 were "unified." According to Soviet official sources this was not
a conversion properly speaking, for the differential rates of return on
the bonds so unified were maintained by adjusting coupon rates on the
17
substitute issue. Although Soviet sources are silent on this matter,
it does appear that maturities were uniformly extended by the unification.
Throughout the 1930s industrialization bond sales campaigns
were conducted in the late spring or early summer of each year to promote
mass subscription of ever increasing issue amounts. The "industrialization"
subscription bonds of the 1930s were offered in two distinct series, be-
tween which the potential purchaser could choose. One series promised a
straight coupon rate. The other featured an unusual lottery bond in which
all bond holders were assured of winning something (plus return of the
face value of the bond) over the nominal term of the bond. These were
called "all-win" bonds, and this feature, of course, constrained both the
number and size of the large winnings.
All outstanding mass subscription bonds were converted in July,
1936. All maturity dates were extended twenty years, coupon rates were
reduced to 4%, and the expected rate of return on the all-win series was
1 s
presumably also reduced. The purpose of the conversion was to reduce
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current and future service charges. Steps had been taken in 1931 to
reduce the "liquidity" of mass subscription bonds and thus to extend
the effective term of these bonds. A bond holder was obliged by law
to obtain special permission before being allowed to pledge his bonds
as collateral for loans from the state savings bank system. However,
19in March, 1937, these restrictions were removed.
In addition to the annual mass subscription bond issue, during
the 1930s the State Budget continued periodically to issue a straight
lottery bond that was sold on the open market and liquid in the sense
that the holder could recover the face value of the instrument at any
time from a state savings bank outlet. Hence they were colloquially
described as "market bonds." Issue amounts were relatively small (see
issues for March, 1929, January, 1930 and "February, 1932 in Table 1),
and they were intended for sale to the better-paid members of Soviet
society. All outstanding issues were converted in 1938 into twenty-year,
"3% state lottery bonds." The conversion was severely adverse.
In March j 1931,, a special ten-year, 10% coupon-rate bond was
issued and earmarked for sale to the State Savings Bank. This instrument
was designed to serve as the mechanism for transferring changes in the
21
savings account liabilities to the State Budget. The earnings were
utilized by the Savings Bank to finance its activities. It is not clear
from available Soviet sources just what happened to this issue subsequently.
Interest rates offered by the savings bank system on the various types of
savings deposits held by the public were reduced in 1936, coincident with
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the conversion of outstanding mass subscription bonds. It seems likely,
therefore, that additional issues t,and/or conversions) took place after
1931, for bond transactions between the Savings Bank and the State Budget
continued through 1963, when the savings bank system became the direct
responsibility of the State Bank.
The last pre-war industrialization bond issue was scheduled
for June, 1941, and it became, in effect, the first issue of the war
period. Immediately upon the outbreak of war, pledging of subscription
bonds was suspended indefinitely. The savings bank system was also
instructed at this time to suspend repurchase of outstanding 3% state
lottery bonds (of 1938) . (The suspension was lifted for these "market
bonds" in January, 1946.) All existing savings account balances were
22frozen for the duration of the war as well.
Several significant changes were introduced in the first "war
bond" subscription campaign of April, 1942. As had been the case in the
1930s, the issue was divided into two series. However, the coupon-rate
series, reduced to 2% per annum, was offered exclusively to collective
farms and (private) productive artels. The purpose of the special series,
which was offered only with the four war bond issues (1942-1945), was to
restrict the liquidity and thus the discretionary purchasing power of these
non-state productive enterprises. In this sense, these special series were
similar functionally to the Issues earmarked for enterprises in the 1920s.
The general population was offered only a lottery premium bond. According
to a Soviet source, the population had demonstrated a preference, in the
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pre-war years for the lottery series, and it was therefore decided to
23
abandon the coupon rate series. The all-win principle was
also replaced by a lottery system in which only a fixed portion of bond
holders (probably 35%) stood to win anything over the nominal twenty-year
course of the issue. This allowed increases in the size and number of
large winnings. Finally, a straight retirement lottery was introduced,
by means of which a certain fixed proportion of (non-winning) outstanding
bonds were to be retired each year, beginning with the sixth year of
A
the issue. The evidence suggests that these changes reduced the expected
rate of return below that for the 1941 mass subscription bond, but the
available data do not permit a more precise conclusion.
The first of five "reconstruction" mass subscription issues
appeared in 1946, with terms Identical to those for war bonds. At the close
of hostilities the Soviet economy had still not regained the level of
output and employment of 1940, Moreover, the population had greatly in-
creased its holdings of financial assets, particularly of hand-to-hand
25
currency balances.' Concern about the probable impact of "pent-up"
demand, coupled with plans for rapid reconstruction (and a poor harvest
in 1946), led to a monetary reform at the end of 1947. The reform called
for an exchange of hand-to-hand (paper) currency at the rate of one new
ruble to ten outstanding. Savings deposits (which included the Soviet
counterpart of the demand deposit) in excess of three- thousand rubles
were reduced at a somewhat more favorable rate. (Money prices and
wages remained unchanged.*)
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A conversion of outstanding State Budget debt accompanied the
monetary reform. The 1938 issue of 3% state lottery bonds (the "market"
bond) was exchanged inD6eei»ber, 1947, at an adverse rate of five rubles to
one in face value, and the date of maturity was set forward twenty years. In
February, 1948, all outstanding mass subscription bonds, with the sole exception
of the 1947 issue, were converted in face value at an adverse rate of three
rubles to one. Lottery premium rates were reduced to 2%, and maturities were
extended to twenty years. These conversions reduced government non-monetary
debt to approximately one-third the pre-conversion level, and debt service
26
charges were reduced even more substantially for the immediately ensuing years.
The adverse effect of the conversions of 1947 and 1948 were offset
to a considerable extent by a series of subsequent reductions in state retail
prices. The retail price index for all comodities (1947 * 100) fell to 50
in 1952, and to 43 by April of 1954. This represented a sharp change in price
trends, for prices had risen at an average rate of 14% per annum between 1928
27
and 1947, The trend reversal, of course, had a favorable effect upon ex-
pected rates of return on bond issues of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Issue
sizes for mass subscription bonds were increased substantially for 1951 and
1952 with no reduction in the nominal rate of return (4%). The struggle for
succession among Stalin's heirs may have been reflected in the sharp reduction
in issue sizes for 1953 and 1954. However, the reduction doubtless also was
a response to the rising cost of bond financing, and the lottery premium rate
was indeed reduced from A to 3%, In .1955 and 1956 the State Budget returned
to the issue levels of the early 1950s, and the lottery premium was further
reduced to 2% (with retail prices essentially constant). The reduction was
accomplished by reducing the proportion of winning certificates to 25%, the
28
elimination of the largest winnings category and a change in retirement schedules.
In April, 1957, an official joint decree of the Communist Party
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and the Council of Ministers announced the termination of mass sub-
scription bonds after 1957. It was also announced that the State
Budget would henceforth cease to conduct premium lotteries for all
outstanding mass subscription bonds. In effect, expected rates of
return were taxed away. Moreover, annual retirement lotteries sched-
uled for the 25.8 billion rubles in outstanding mass subscription
29bonds were postponed for a twenty-year period. " T?bis was, then, a
final and drastic conversion of state debt and the third in little
more than twenty years (1936, 1948 and 1957), The 3% state lottery
bond (of 1947) was not. affected by these rulings,
A final and relatively small (1.5 billion rubles) mass
subscription bond issue was floated in May, 1957. It promised a 2%
lottery premium rate for a term of five years. This issue was designed
to smooth the transition for the State Budget, for its receipts had
already been fixed by the 1957 plan. By implication, the decision to
terminate mass subscription bond issues was taken quickly. It is in-
teresting to note that organizers of the subscription campaign of 1957
were instructed that individual sxibscriptions were not to exceed two
weeks pay and that the bonds were not to be sold to those with incomes
of less then fifty rubles per month.
According to the original decree, the retirement of pre-1957
subscription bonds was scheduled to begin in 1977 and to extend through
1996. However, in May
s 19 71, Leonln Brezhnev announced at the XXIV
Party Congress a plan for "early" retirement of outstanding bonds.
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Retirement is now scheduled to begin in 1974 and to be completed in 1990.
It calls for the retirement each year of 1.0 billion rubles 1974-1975, of
1.2 billion 1976-1980, of 1.5 billion 1981-1985, of 2.0 billion 1986-1989,
^0
and of 2.3 billion in 1990." Presumably, a lottery will be utilized to
determine the order of retirements.
In November, 1967, the last lottery was held to determine winners
in the 3% state lottery bond issue of 1947. Meanwhile, a new 3% lottery
bond had been Issued in July, 1966, which was sold "somewhat" above face
value. However, holders of the 1947 bond (i.e., non-winners) were permitted
to exchange them without penalty (at face value) for the new issue, and 90%
were reportedly so exchanged. On January 1, 1972, the total stock of 3%
state lottery bonds (1966 issue) outstanding stood at 2.9 billion rubles. •L
Since these bonds may be freely bought or sold at any time at state savings
bank outlets, it is clear that there are risk-seekers among the Soviet
population to whom the lottery principle is appealing. The expected rate
of return on 3% lottery bonds is considerably less than the 3% per annum
rate guaranteed on long-term savings accounts. (Savings account deposits
32
totaled 53.2 billion rubles on January 1, 1972. ")
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II. Structure and Characteristics of Post-War Soviet Bond Issues
The basic building block of all Soviet bond issues is the razriad ,
which may be best translated in this context as "sub-series" or "order."
For all post-war mass subscription issues, except the 1948 conversion issue,
this basic unit was one-million, ten-ruble bond certificates, or ten million
rubles face value, Thus, the 3.79 billion ruble issue subscribed in 1552
was composed of 379 orders (razriadi ) . The 1948 conversion issue was com-
posed of orders of 2,5 million twenty-ruble certificates (50 million rubies
per razriad) . The £azriad is the basic unit for each issue because winnings
and the order of retirement (i.e., the expected rate of return) are fixed
In terms of it.
For all post-war mass subscription bonds, lotteries were held
twice a year to determine winning certificates, and the number of winning
certificates was fixed per razriad for each of the forty semi-annual
lotteries. Winning certificates were retired, and the stated value of
winnings Included the face value oi the bond. Thus a certain, pre-estabr-
lished fraction of each issue was retired each year in this way (see Table
2), With the exception of the issues for 1955 through 1957, the size of
total annual winnings and the number of certificates retired in this way
declined by a small amount in the eleventh and sixteenth year of the
twenty-year nominal terra. This was effected by reducing the number of
twenty-ruble prizes (i.e., a ten-ruble return on a ten-ruble bond).
Each post-war mas3 subscription bond Issue also featured a second
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Table 2
Notes :
a. See text for an explanation of premium rates.
b. The actual balance outstanding was 2:i,930 million rubles, which indicates
that the reconstruction presented here is reasonably accurate. This figure
comes from: A. G. Zverev, Goaudarstvennye zaimy i vklady v sberegatel*nye
kassy (Leningrad: Gosfinizdat, 1957), p. 23.
c. Actual subscription total.
Sources :
L. B. Valler, "Razvitie gosudarstvennogo kredita v SSSR," M. A. Nadis and A. I.
Iagodinskii, "Osnovnye usloviia i struktura gosudarstvennykh zaimov,"
and the Addendum, all in P. la. Bmitrichev, ed., Gosudarstvennye zaimy v
SSSR (Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1956), pp. 20-43, 44-63 and 152-157 respectively,
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lottery to determine the order in which non-winning certificates were
to be retired during the nominal term of the issue. The retirement
lottery was scheduled to he held once-a-year beginning in the sixth
year from date of issue. The fraction of bonds retired per razriad
by the retirement lottery increased in the twelfth and seventeenth
years of the issue (Table 2) . Certificates not retired by either
"winning" or "retirement" lotteries over the twenty-year course of
the issue could be redeemed at face value from state savings bank out-
lets during the twenty-first year (only).
Although all post-war bond issues were for a nominal twenty-
year term, the effective term was considerably less as a result of the
two retirement mechanisms described above. It was Soviet practice to
calculate the "average term" as the effective number of years that the
funds made available by each issue remained at the disposal of the State
Budget. "Average term" was calculated in the following manner. The face
value of bonds retired in each of the forty winning lotteries was multi-
plied by the number of years from the original date of issue that each
lottery was held. Bonds retired in the straight retirement lotteries,
which began in the sixth year of the loan, were treated in the same fashion.
The sum of these two calculations was then divided by the face value of
the total actual issue, yielding the average term in years. For example,
the funds made available to the State Budget by the 1952 mass subscription
bond issue for a nominal twenty-year term, were equivalent to a hypothetical
loan for the same total ruble amount for a period of 12.6 years, absence
interim retirements. Examination of the time shapes of bond retirement
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schedules for the post-war years (Table 2) shows an extension in average
terms brought about by bunching retirements via the retirement lottery
in the later years.
The stated premium rate on all post-war (and presumably earlier
straight lottery bonds) was determined on the basis of the average term
computation,, As mentioned earlier, the 4% lottery premium rate officially
announced for the 1.952 issue, for example, did not represent the expected
rate of return. It is obtained instead by dividing the total winnings
scheduled for the issue over its twenty-year nominal term by the average
term, which yields the average annual payout. Dividing through by the
actual issue ruble volume (times 100) yields the "average annual" interest
cost to the State Budget, or a little in excess of 4% for the 1952 issue.
This number is obviously considerably in excess of the true expected rate
of return on the 1952 issue. It is easy to see why earlier students of the
Soviet economy overestimated expected rates of return on Soviet bond issues,
for they were apparently unaware of the difference between nominal and
34
average terms.
Computation of the true expected rate of return to Soviet
bond holders, in conformity with Western practice, is, of course, rather
complicated. This is a topic in itself, so let me indicate here only
the general outline of what is involved and of the outcome. First, only
a certain fraction of bonds stood to be drawn in the winning lotteries
over the nominal term of the loan (Table 2). A purchaser, for example, of
a ten-ruble 1952 certificate, had a. 0.35 chance of "winning" anything at
all. There was a very small probability that he would win the largest
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prize available (2,500 rubles, less the ten-ruble nominal value of
his certificate) in the first winning lottery ,which was scheduled approx-
imately six months following fulfillment of his subscription. In this
instance, of course, the rate of return is astronomical. In fact, the
rate of return obtained by all winning bond holders over the twenty-year
nominal term was relatively high, for the smallest winning was ten rubles
on a ten-ruble certificate in the fortieth lottery at the end of the
twentieth year. However, there was, correspondingly, a 0.65 chance of
recovering nothing more than the face value of the bond (barring conver-
sions, postponements, etc.), and this might occur as late as the twenty-
one years from the date of purchase. Thus the expected rate of return
for any Soviet post-war mass subscription bond depends upon the opportunity
rate of return that is selected to compute the negative rate of return
on non-winning bonds™ Even if one uses as an opportunity rate of return
the rate offered by the state savings bank system on long-term deposits,
i.e., 3% for the latter part of this period, the expected rate of return
that emerges is very low.
Downward adjustments in the reported premium rate on post-war
mass subscription bonds (see Table 1, Column 20) were effected by reducing
the proportion of winning bonds per razriad and by eliminating large
lottery prizes. Consequently, the decline in the stated premium rate
reflects, but does not measure 3 a decrease in expected rate of return.
Differential rates of inflation and the historical frequency of adverse bond
conversions ought also to be taken into account in determining expected rates
of return to bond purchasers. Only the first and the last mass subscription
bond issues (February, 1927 and Kay, 1957 respectively ) escaped conversion.
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The only domestic bond in circulation in the Soviet Union
today is the twenty-year term, 3% state lottery bond of 1966. All terms
and conditions of its predecessor, the December, 1947 conversion issue,
were faithfully executed. The 1947 issue called for six "basic" winnings
lotteries per year, with a top premium of 5,000 rubles on a twenty-ruble
certificate, and for an annual supplementary lottery with a top prize of
10,000 rubles. The 3% lottery bond could be purchased or sold at any time
at state savings bank outlets, and all outstanding certificates participated
in all "basic" annual lotteries. The annual supplementary lottery was
restricted to bonds held at least nine months, as an incentive to long-term
lending. Winning certificates were retired, so a certain fraction of the
issue was retired each year. For the 1947 issue, 25% of all bonds sold
was scheduled to be retired over the nominal twenty-year course of the
issue. Non-winning certificates could be redeemed at any time, but in
no case later than 1 January 1970. The 3% premium return was calculated
as described above for mass subscription issues. However, as the 3%
state lottery bond had no provisions for a straight retirement lottery
(i.e., in addition to the winning lotteries), the expected rate of return
was considerably less than for mass subscription issues. The difference
reflected, then,an implicit liquidity premium.
A new 3% state lottery bond was offered for sale beginning in
July, 1966. It was similar to the 1947 issue in that it was also a nominal
twenty-year bond and could be freely bought and sold at any time at state
savings bank outlets. However , the 1966 issue is sold "somewhat" above
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face value and repurchased only at face value. Holders of outstanding
(non-winning) 1947 bonds were permitted to exchange them for the new
issue at face value (between December 1, 1967 and June 1, 1968 only),
and, reportedly, 90% of the 1.3 billion rubles worth of bonds outstanding
36in November, 1967, were so exchanged.
The 1966 issue differed somewhat from the 1947 in certain other
provisions. The supplementary lottery was abolished (and with it the largest
prize of i0,000 rubles), and the number of "basic" lotteries was increased
to eight per year. By rearranging the number of prizes, the fraction of
certificates scheduled to win anything at all was increased from 25 to 30%.
Ten and twenty ruble bonds are available, but winnings are calculated on
twenty-ruble certificates, i.e., the ten-ruble certificate is half a bond.
The expected rate of return on 1966 3% state lottery bonds
depends, of course, upon the opportunity return that is utilized to cal-
culate the (negative) rate of return on non-winning bonds. Presumably,
the lowest savings bank rate (2%) (on what are essentially demand deposits)
is appropriate in this instance since these are readily marketable bonds.
Given this assumption, the expected rate of return on 3% state lottery
37
bonds is less than 1%.
III. An -Analysis of Soviet Domestic Bond Policy
l
The development of the mass subscription bond at the end of the
1920s provided the State Budget with what proved to be a very effective
device for raising funds from the population during rapid industrialization,
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the war and post-war reconstruction. During these years the sale of
domestic bonds to the population ordinarily raised as much or more than
was obtained by direct personal income taxes. The organization of bond
subscription committees at the grass roots level in all enterprises and
institutions and the linking of bond promotion with major social and
economic objectives effectively removed bond sales from the marketplace
into an arena in which considerable "moral" pressure could be applied
to potential subscribers. Moreover, installment purchase helped to
minimize the immediate financial impact of bond subscription, and payroll
38
deduction afforded an efficient means of enforcing timely payment.
The extensive utilization of lottery devices may be explained
as the outcome of several related factors. From the late 1920s onward
the population offered the only source of private saving. Apart from
the collective farms and certain (private) productive artels, productive
enterprises were publicaily owned, and other, non-financial devices had
been developed to monitor and control enterprise cash balances and to
transfer enterprise retained earnings to the State Budget. The principal
target of domestic bond sales was, therefore, the population, for it alone
owned discretionary cash balances. In non-socialist countries, where the
financial system is likely to be dominated instead by private financial
end non-financial enterprises, extensive use of lottery bond instruments
would, of course, be much less likely.
Both practical experience elsewhere and theory suggest that
39lottery devices may offer very successful means of tapping household savings.
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Sovict experience is interesting in this respect, because the shift away
from the "all-win" principle in the early 1940s Was explained as reflecting
the population's preference for taking larger gambles (i.e., a smaller
chance of winning a larger prize). Lotteries, of course, provide enter-
tainment as well as the chance to make a killing, and the large number
of winning lotteries that were ordinarily held each year provided consid-
erable action. During 1955, for example, some eighteen winning lotteries
were held on subscription bonds and seven for 3% state lottery bonds. The
sheer number of lotteries held in any given year may also have tended to
exaggerate the likelihood of winning.
The history of Soviet domestic bond policy suggests an over-
weaning official concern about service charges on outstanding debt. Steps
were repeatedly taken to minimize and/or to reduce these charges outright.
The conversions of 1936, 1938, 1947, 1948 and 1957 were undertaken mainly
for this reason, as was the systematic reduction in expected rates of
return from 1929 onward. Extensive exploitation of lottery devices should
be viewed in this light as well, for the determination of the expected
rate of return on any given Soviet lottery bond is impossible in the
absence of a complete description of the time shapes of winnings and retire-
ment.
The available data on bond receipts, debt service charges and
net funds raised by domestic bond financing, 1940-1970, are presented in
Table 3. That mass subscription bond sales dominated State Budget bond
proceeds is obvious from an examination of Rows D and E.
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Table 3
Sources :
Row A
1940-46, 1950: V. P. D'iachenko, "Sovetskia sistema flnansov 1 kredita v bor'be za
sotsialisticheskoe pereustroistvo ekonomiki i postroenie kommunizma v SSSR," In
L. M. Gatovskil, ed., Sovetskla sotslalisticheskaia ekonomlka 1917-1957 gg .
(Moscow: 1957), pp. 581, 586.
1947-49, 1951-53: Franklyn D. Holzman, Soviet Taxation (Cambridge: Harvard University,
1955), p. 222.
1955, 1960-65: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR i biudzhety soiuznykh respublik (Moscow:
Izdat. Finansy, 1966), p. 10.
1956-59: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR i biudzhety soiuznykh respublik (Moscow:
Gosfinizdat, 1962), p. 7.
1966: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR 1 biudzhety soiuznykh respublik 1966-1970 gg .
(Moscow: Izdat. Finansy, 1972), p. 11.
Row B
1940-46: D'iachenko, "Sovetskaia sistema finansov," pp. 581, 586.
1947-1952: Holzman, Soviet Taxation
, p. 222.
1953-54: Gosudarstvennye biudzhety soiuznykh respublik v piatoi piatiletke (Moscow:
Gosfinizdat, 1957), p. 5.
1955-1960: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1962), p. 9.
1961-65: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1966), p. 11.
1966
:
Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1972), p. 12.
Row D
1940-45: K. N, Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii bludzheta sovetskogo goeudarstva (Moscow:
Gosfinizdat, 1954), p. 316,
1946-47: A. Zverev, "Sovetskie finansy i stroitel'sto sotsializma v SSSR," In Finansy
SSSR za XXX let (Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1947), p. 76.
1950, 1955-58: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1962), p. 9.
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1951, 1954: Gosudarstvennye bludzhety (1957), p. 5.
1952: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963), p. 635.
1953: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1959), p. 899.
Row F
1940, 1950, 1955-60: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1962), p. 9.
1946-1954: A. G. Zverev, Gosudarstvennye zaimy i vklady v sberegatel'nye kassy
(Leningrad: Gosfinizdat, 1957), p. 36, and Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii biudzheta ,
p. 399, who gives the total for 1946-1950.
1961-65: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1966), p. 11.
1966: Gosudarstvennye biudzhet SSSR (1972), p. 12.
Row H
1940, 1950, 1953, 1955-56, 1958: Narodnoe khoziaistvo (1958), p. 900.
1941: R. W. Davies, The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System (Cambridge: The
University, 1958), p. 296.
1951: Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii biudzheta
,
p. 488
1952, 1959, 1961-62: Narodnoe khoziaistvo (1962), p. 635.
1957: (Plan) A. G. Zverev, "Finansy SSSR za 40 let sovetskol vlasti," in N. Laptev,
ed., Finansy i sotaialist icheskoe sf oitel'styo (Moscow : Gosfinizdat, 1957), p. 77
1960, 1965: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 g. (Moscow: Izdat. Statistika, 1970),
p. 769.
1963-64: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1964 (Moscow: Izdat. Statistika, 1965), p. 770.
1966: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 196S (Moscow: Izdat, Statistika, 1969), p. 774.
Row J
1940-1953: Plotnikov, Ocherki istorii biudzheta
, pp. 317, 488.
1946-1956: Zverev, Gosudarstyeimye zaimy i vklady
, p. 25.
1957: (Plan) Zverev, "Finansy SSSR za 40 let," p. 77.
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Debt service charges on mass subscription debt absorbed a little
ucre than 40% of proceeds from new subscriptions in 1955 and 1956 (Tabic 3,
Row K), and net proceeds from all bond sales had declined to between 4-5%
of State Budget receipts in these years (Rows A and L) . Debt service
charges on mass subscription bonds issued prior to 1957 were scheduled
to rise from 1.39 billion rubles in 1956 (Row L) to a peak of approximately
2.5 billion in 1967-58 (see estimate in Table 2). Had issues continued
after 1957 , at the 1956 levels, service charges would have climbed to 2.5
billion rubles by 1962 instead.
The official reasons given for terminating mass subscription
bond campaigns were (1) the growth of debt service charges and (2) the
undesirability of increasing annual issue amounts beyond the 3.5 billion
40
ruble level of 1955 and 1956:
If the issue of bonds continues in larger volume than, for
example, in 1956, this would be burdensome to the population.
But if bonds are issued in smaller volume, then it (bond pro-
ceeds) would almost entirely be absorbed by winnings and
retirement of outstanding issues.
This explanation assumes that the population regarded bond subscriptions
in large part is simply a tax, which t le very low rates >f return on
recent issues certainly justified. The first sentence implies official
unwillingness to males new subscription bond issues more attractive by
increasing the rate of return promised, and, in any case, the increase
required would certainly have been very substantial. The second sentence,
r it means anything economic at all* implies an official preference with
respect to the redistributive consequences of financing forthcoming debt
vice charges by means of new issues. Faithful fulfillment of the terms
id conditions under which the outstanding debt had been floated would have
ntalled either a redistribution of income within the household sector in
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favor of existing bond holders or a transfer of command over real resources
from the State Budget to existing bond holders. It would not have mattered
in the first instance whether this was effected by additional bond sales
or by some form of direct taxation, and, therefore, the official explanation
does not really address the question of why it was decided to abandon sub-
scription bond sales. It does suggests however, official unwillingness
to permit a redistribution of income in favor of existing bondholders at
the expense of either current earned personal income or of other budget
outlays.
The decision to default on outstanding bonds cannot be interpreted
as somehow "deflationary 1 ' in the long run* unless the very improbable
assumption is made that the State Budget would otherwise have financed
debt service and retirements by means of State Bank overdrafts, i.e., by
"printing" money. Historically, the State Budget had had recourse to
overdraft finance only in times of dire emergency since the early 1920s,
42
as, for example
.j during the early years of WWII,
The 1957 conversion was accompanied by the promise that mass
subscription bonds would not be Issuer* in the future. Consequently, the
net effect was not disadvantageous for all bond holders. In exchange
for foregoing the opportunity to participate in winning lotteries (i.e.,
the expectation of a possible positive return) and a twenty-year delay in
redemption dates for bonds previously purchased, the population was pro-
mised relief from future bond subscriptions. The recommended subscription
in 1956 was three to four weeks pay, and installment payments during that
year totaled 3.28 billion rubies (Table 3, Row D). The flow of debt
service payments to the population on mass subscription bonds only was
1.39 billion rubles in 1956 and 1.60 billion in 1957 (Row J). Thus the

-30-
complete abaxidonment of subscription bonds would have yielded a net gain
of at least 1.7 billion rubies in current Income to the population as
a whole. The final 1957 Issue reduced the actual gain to about 1.0
billion rubles in 1958..
Of course, only certain members of the population stood to "gain"
in this way. The 1957 reform was particularly disadvantageous to the older
members of the population who would have held a disproportionate share of
outstanding bonds and a much smaller chance of surviving the "freeze."
RoIzman*!in fact* interpreted the reform as an attempt by Khrushchev to
43gain the support of the young. Perhaps this was in part the case* but
the reform also effected a redistribution disadvantageous to higher income
classes as well since bond sales had been based upon a progressive scale
(i.e.* the purchase of a fixed number of week's earnings). Thus the 1957
reform produced an increase in disposable income, a reduction in the flow
of unearned income relative to earned income,, and an intergenerational and
Inter-income class redistribution of income. Morris Bornstein may, there-
fore* have been correct i« interpreting the reform as having "a favorable
44
effect (from the standpoint of the regime) on worker incentives." It
should be noted, though, that previous bond conversions would have had
the same effect la some degree.
Franklyn Hoizman has put forward another reason to explain the
abandonment of mass subscription bonds. Indeed, he predicted in 1955 an
early termination of new issues on the basis of &n estimate of the "tax
45burden of these bonds. This would seem to have been a case, unfortunately,
of being right for the wrong reasons* for Holzman's prediction was founded
on the mistaken assumption that state retail prices would continue to fall
after 1954, For somewhat technical reasons, Holzman also underestimated
46
the tax burden as of 1954.
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There can be little question that the tax burden of subscrip-
tion bonds decreased between 1947 and 1954, as the state retail price
level was reduced by more than one~haj.f , but the downward trend ended
in 1954. Also, the bond lottery premium was reduced from 4 to 3% in
1952 and again from 3 to 2% in 1955, and these reductions at least partially
offset the favorable effect of earlier price declines upon expected rates
of return. By 1957, the tax burden of mass subscription bonds had
stabilized at a relatively high rate, even if the state savings bank rate
is utilized rather than Holzman's hypothetical "market" rate. Thus the
tax burden argument cannot provide the impetus to the 1957 reform.
Instead, the decision to abolish bond subscriptions should be
interpreted mainly as a decision to decrease taxes on the population,
since the bond was in large pare merely a tax. The decision to cease
paying lottery premiums and to freeze outstanding bonds represented a
decision to substitute a new tax to compensate partially for the loss
of bond subscription revenue. But the net effect was to decrease taxes
on the population, and this effect was augmented by a reduction in personal
47income tax rates in 1958. To the extent that reduced taxation was re-
flected in a relative decline in State Budget outlays, the net effect
was to transfer purchasing power to the household sector, and to do so
in such a way that, in the long run, it benefited primarily the young
48
and the lower-income classes.
Ironically, to the extent that members of the population were
prepared to save some portion of the Income released by the tax burden of
subscription bonds, the 1957 reform reflected a decision by the State
Budget to ta^Jess and to bcrrow raore> by virtue of the state's monopoly
on all financial channels. In other words, the population was free to

•: 2-
allocate 3ome portion of Its increase in disposable income among the
various financial channels available, and savings accounts had always
offered a higher rate of return, much greater liquidity and, historically,
a considerably smaller risk of confiscation. Moreover, for those in-
clined to gamble, the 3% state lottery bond, a special type of "lottery
premium" savings account and various straight lotteries remained
available
.
James R. Millar
University of Illinois (U-C)
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Notes
1. Brief descriptions of domestic bond policy may be found in the
standard reference works on the Soviet State Budget: Franklyn D.
Holzman, Soviet Taxation (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1955) and
R. W. Davies, The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System (Cambridge:
University Press, 1958). Passing reference to state bonds may also
be found in Alec Wove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. (Pelican
Books, 1972) and Maurice Dobb, Sovie t Economic Development Since 1917
(New York: International Publishers, 1966). See also, Franklyn D.
Holzman, "An Estimate of the Tax Element in Soviet Bonds," American
Economic Review, XLVII (June 1957), 390-396, which represents the only
attempt that has been made to determine the expected rate of return on
Soviet domestic bonds. Unfortunately, these sources are not only brief,
but inaccurate in certain respects.
2. Official Soviet sources report a budget surplus for all years since
1928-1929, except for 1941, 1942 and 1943. However, these reports are
based upon the cash-flow budget, which includes the flow of funds through
financial channels to the State Budget. According to Western convention,
the Soviet State Budget was rarely in surplus until very recent times.
See Holzman, Soviet Taxation, pp. 228-230.
3. For a description of the alternatives utilized during the early war
years see James R. Millar, "The Soviet War Budget," Soviet Studies (forth-
coming) .
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4. L. B. Valler, "Razvitie gosudarstvennogo kredita v SSSR," in
P. la. Dmitrichev, ed. „ Gosudarstvennye zaimy y SSSR (Moscow:
Gosfinizdat, 1956), p. 27; Holzman, Sovie t Taxation, p, 217 (Table
47); Table 3 in the text below.
5. Iu. M. Belugin, "Razvitie sberegatel'nykh kass SSSR," in P. A.
Chetverikov
s
ed,
,
Sberegatel'nye kassy SSSR za 50 le t (Moscow: Izdat.
Finansy,, 1972), pp. 24-25.
6. For' an analysis of non-socialist budgets see Harley H. Hinrichs,
A General Theory of Tax Structure Change During Economic Development
(Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 1966).
7. Table 1 omits certain domestic bond issues by agencies and organi-
zations other than the State Budget. Between 1923 and 1934 some nineteen
bond issues were floated by various komissariats, trusts and societies,
including one by the Moscow ispolcom . For a brief description of these
issues see V. P. D'iachenko et al. , eds., Flnansovo-kreditnyi slovar
'
(Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1961), t. I, pp. 304-305.
8. Almost all Soviet bonds provided for the retirement of a certain
fraction of the outstanding issue in each year of the. stated term. Terms
to maturity given in Table. 1 are maximums and thus overstate effective
terms, as is explained in the text below, The trend in maximum terms, in
fact, understates somewhat that for effective terms.
i
9. Valler } "Razvltie gosudarstvennogo kredita," p. 24.
10. This acronym refers to the middlemen who were permitted to operate
during the period, of the New Economic Policy of the 1920s.
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11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Davies, The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System
,
pp. 227-
228. For a thorough discussion of bank controls* see Christine Netishen
Wollan, The Financial Policy of the Soviet State Bank, 1932-1970 (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urb ana-Champaign, 1972), pp.
156-184,
14. For a brief description of lottery, or premium, bonds in the Brlttish
Isles, see Harvey E. Fisk, English Public Finance From the Revolution of
1688 (New York; Bankers Trust Company, 1920), pp. 108-115. For more
extended treatment, see C. L'Estrange Ewen, Lotteries and Sweepstakes
(London : Heath Cranton Ltd., 1932).
15. A. A. Gerasimov, "Organizatsiia razmashcheniia gosudarstvennykh
zaimovj" in P. la. Dmitrichev, ed. , Gosudarstvennye zaimy v SSSR (Moscow:
Gosfinizdat, 1956), pp. 74-86,
16. Compare official issue amounts as given in B'lachenko et al. , eds.
Finansov-kredi tnyl slovar \ pp, 301-304, with actual subscription totals
as given by Valler, "Razvitle gosudarstvetmogo kredita," pp. 27-43.
17. D T iachenko et al^, eds., Finansoyo-kreditnyi slovar'
,
p. 300; M. I.u.
Nakhmanovich, "Gosudarstvennye zaimy SSSR i ikh rol' na razlichnykh etapakh
razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva. Gosudarstvennye zaimy i denezhno-veshchevye
loterei v sovremermykh usloviiakh," in P. A. Chetverikov, Sberegatel'nye
kassy SSSR za 50 let (Moscow: Izdat, Finansy, 1972), p., 46.
18. Valler, "Razvitie gosudarstvennogo kredita," pp. 30-31.
19. Ibid
. , p. 31; Nakhmanovich, "Gosudarstvennye zaimy SSS5i," pp. 47-48.
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20. Valler, "Razvitie gooudarstvennogo kredita," pp. 30-31.
21. G. Eremeeva, Razvitie aberegatel'nogo dela v SSSR (Moscow: Gosfinizdat,
1958), p. 63.
22. Valler, "Razvitie gosudarstvennogo kredita," p. 35.
23. Ibid,
24. See Table 2 below.
25. M. L, Tamarchenko , Spvetskle finansy v period Velikoi OtecheBtvennoi
voiny (Moscow: Izdat. Flnansy, 1967), p. 40.
26. Valuer, "Razvitie gosudarstvennogo kredita," pp. 36-39.
27. A.N. Malafeev, Istoriia tsenoobrazovanlia v SSSR, 1917-1963,
(Moscow: Izdat. "Mysl f,f , 1964), p. 405..
28. See Table 2 below.
29. A. G. Zverev, Gosudarstverin^ve
_
zaimy^ i yklady v sbeyegatel*nye kassy
(Leningrad: Gosfinizdat, 1957), pp. 27-28, Note that all ruble figures
given here and elsewhere are in "new" rubles, i.e., the decimal was moved
one place to the left in 1960.
30. M. lu, Nakhmanovich , "Gosudarstvennye zaimy SSSR," p. 52.
^" Ibid- pp. 52-54
32. Tsentral'noe statisticheskoa upravlenie, Karodnoe kho ziais tvo S SSR ,
1922-1972 gg. (Moscow: Izdat. Statlstika, 1973),, p. 373.
33. The description thai follow- Is based on Table 2 and M. A. Nadis and
A- I, Yagodiaskii, "Osnovy- usloviia L sfcruktura gosudarstvennykh zaimov,"
and "Tirazhi vyigryshei i tirazhi pogasheniia po gosudarstvennym zaimam,"
in P. la. Dmitrlchev, ed., Gosudarstvennye zaimy v SSSR (Moscow; Gosfinisdat,
1956), pp. 44-63 and 1C0-108.

34* See references given In note I, especially, Holzman, "The Tax Element
in Soviet Bonds/' which presents the only previous attempt to calculate
the expected rate of return on Soviet bonds.
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